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Do Machines Replicate Humans? Toward a Unified
Understanding of Radicalizing Content on the Open
Social Web
Margeret Hall , Michael Logan, Gina S. Ligon, and Douglas C. Derrick
The advent of the Internet inadvertently augmented the functioning and success of violent extremist
organizations. Terrorist organizations like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) use the Internet
to project their message to a global audience. The majority of research and practice on web‐based
terrorist propaganda uses human coders to classify content, raising serious concerns such as burnout,
mental stress, and reliability of the coded data. More recently, technology platforms and researchers
have started to examine the online content using automated classification procedures. However, there
are questions about the robustness of automated procedures, given insufficient research comparing
and contextualizing the difference between human and machine coding. This article compares output
of three text analytics packages with that of human coders on a sample of one hundred nonindexed web
pages associated with ISIS. We find that prevalent topics (e.g., holy war) are accurately detected by the
three packages whereas nuanced concepts (Lone Wolf attacks) are generally missed. Our findings
suggest that naïve approaches of standard applications do not approximate human understanding, and
therefore consumption, of radicalizing content. Before radicalizing content can be automatically de-
tected, we need a closer approximation to human understanding.
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La llegada de Internet ha aumentado, sin darse cuenta, el funcionamiento y el éxito de las organ-
izaciones extremistas violentas. Las organizaciones terroristas como el Estado Islámico de Irak y Siria
(EI) utilizan el Internet para proyectar sus mensajes a una audiencia mundial. La mayoría de las
investigaciones y prácticas sobre propaganda terrorista basada en la web utilizan codificadores hu-
manos para clasificar el contenido, lo que plantea serias preocupaciones como el agotamiento, el estrés
mental y la confiabilidad de los datos codificados. Más recientemente, las plataformas de tecnología y
los investigadores han empezado a examinar el contenido en línea a través del uso de procedimientos de
clasificación automatizadas. Sin embargo, hay preguntas acerca de qué tan robustos son los proce-
dimientos automáticos, dada la insuficiente investigación que compare y contextualice la diferencia
entre la codificación humana y la automática. Este artículo compara el resultado de tres paquetes de
análisis de texto con el de los codificadores humanos en una muestra de 100 páginas web no indexadas
asociadas con ISIS. Hallamos que los temas prevalentes (por ejemplo: guerra santa) son exitosamente
detectados por los tres paquetes, mientras que los conceptos más matizados (ataques de lobo solitario)
no lo son. Nuestros hallazgos sugieren que los métodos ingenuos de aplicaciones estándar no se
acercan a la comprensión humana, y por ende al consumo, del contenido radicalizador. Antes de que el
contenido radicalizador pueda ser detectado automáticamente, necesitamos una aproximación más
cercana a la comprensión humana.
PALABRAS CLAVE: redes sociales, organizaciones extremistas violentas, LIWC, asignación latente de
dirichlet, n‐gramas, lucha contra el terrorismo
Introduction
The world is seemingly continually surprised by the advance of deviant con-
tent on social media and the open Internet (Ingram, 2016). This is particularly true
in the case of violent extremist organizations (VEOs)—that is, coordinated efforts
among individuals with a shared ideological framework and goal toward collective
actions (Ligon, Simi, Harms, & Harris, 2013). The capacity for posting and hosting
ever‐more disturbing, violent propaganda is matched only by the willingness of
(vulnerable) individuals to consume it. Attempting to proactively detect (and re-
move) VEO content from open social platforms is a large‐scale social and research
problem (UNCTED, 2016, Whine, 2010).
As VEO content appears online it swims in an ocean of other unrelated content,
leaving the noise‐to‐signal ratio very high. To solve the detection problem, manual
approaches like content coding, or labeling, have been standard. On one hand,
manual approaches have proven to be inappropriate to the task of identifying and
treating content at scale. Human understanding is the “gold standard” of classi-
fication, but with respect to VEO content it is a poor strategy due to aspects like
coder burnout and potential errors and bias due to inexact classification definitions.
Especially, with nuanced or latent VEO content there can be worldview conflicts
(e.g., conflicts with personally held beliefs on free speech or religion) leading to
stress in the coder, and few explicit, standardized definitions that apply to online
material exist except in cases of depictions of crime (Facebook, 2019; Logan & Hall,
2019). Even with these potential downsides, manual coding is currently in use, or
forms part of an artificial intelligence (AI) strategy at the major social content
platforms and research labs (Alonso, 2019). On the other hand, even the most
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successful AI tools misclassify radicalizing content. For example, Facebook re-
ported finding 99 percent of terror‐related content in Q1‐3 of 2018 (https://
newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/11/staying‐ahead‐of‐terrorists/). This leaves an
estimated one hundred forty‐three thousand terror‐related content items, which
were unable to be classified. The length of time the identified items were available
on the platform before being identified ranged from two minutes to seven hundred
and seventy days in Q3 2018. Most misclassification comes from the advent of new
modalities of content provision or from disagreement between human definitions
and machine classification. These misclassifications suggest a potential systematic
bias in the classifier in use.
Given its positive attributes, including increased efficiency and low researcher
exposure, automated detection of VEO content online should be a broad research
and societal goal (Correa & Sureka, 2013). However, a fundamental challenge is
reducing the barriers to machine understanding (Alonso, 2019), given even in bi-
nary classification schemes some measure of disagreement exists (Hashemi & Hall,
2018, 2019). Approaches to classification tend to either be fully machine (e.g., Al-
ghamdi & Selamat, 2012; Sabbah, Selamat, & Selamat, 2014; Scrivens, Davies, Frank,
& Mei, 2016) or human (e.g., Droogan & Peattie, 2016; Ligon, Hall, & Braun, 2018;
Torres, Jordán, & Horsburgh, 2006; Torres‐Soriano, 2016). Very few studies to date
compare performance of humans and machines when classifying the underlying
themes of radicalizing content. Even those with mixed modalities rarely show
empirically the degree to which human coders and machines classifying the same
radicalizing content have similar results (Cohen, Kruglanski, Gelfand, Webber, &
Gunaratna, 2016; Correa & Sureka, 2013, Prentice, Taylor, Rayson, Hoskins, &
O’Loughlin, 2011)—implying that we have an incomplete understanding of the
degree of overlap of human and machine understandings of content and its clas-
sification. This uncertainty has an unknown impact on the way stakeholders
manage their detection/classification regimes. Each of these differences contributes
to/against external and internal validity and overall reliability of the analyses
(Ruths & Pfeffer, 2014). Applications and algorithms to be deployed in the future
are dependent upon some agreement of which content is radical: this does not
currently exist.
We propose to help close that gap by considering the domain of text analysis.
This study applies two probabilistic topic modeling algorithms and one off‐the‐
shelf sentiment analysis package to an extant data set, namely 100 transient web-
sites associated with the Islamic State (ISIS) (see the Methodology section). The
coding themes in use are created by human coders evaluating ISIS content from
these one hundred open websites (Derrick, Sporer, Church, & Ligon, 2017b). We
introduce the themes established in (Derrick et al., 2017b) and refer to this
throughout as the “benchmark study.” The current study identified the proba-
bilistic topic models n‐grams (Jurafsky & Martin, 2014) and latent
dirichlet allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2003) as the most appropriate, albeit
simplistic, methodologies to assess the unlabeled corpus for a first attempt at
comparing the performance of human and machines when coding VEO content. In
addition, we assess the results of the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC)
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sentiment analysis program (Pennebaker, 2011). We chose these three packages due
to their prevalence in related studies, their relatively strong benchmarks, and the
ease of use for noncomputational scholars. The aim of this evaluation is assessing
the degree to which computer‐mediated coding and human coders agree on the underlying
themes of a radical corpus. The thematic view in use reflects the reality that different
propaganda types exist, and that these differently impact individuals’ intent to act
offline (Crosset, Tanner, & Campana, 2019).
It is important to identify the degree to which a gap exists between humans and
machines due to the nature of the content. The imperative from a platform per-
spective reflects that VEO content generally violates their Terms of Service. More
important is the human dimension: individuals consuming VEO content on the
open social web may be vulnerable to its messaging. Pathways to radicalizing
are many (Ligon et al., 2018); appropriately diagnosing radicalizing content before
it can impact an individual is therefore critical. Finding that machines and humans
are reasonably similar in their understanding of the themes that exist in radicalizing
content would support a stronger content management regime overall.
In the next section we present and classify the relevant literature, showing that
the question of performance of automated algorithms compared with human‐
coded benchmarks in VEO content is under‐addressed in the literature. We present
our research question, and then introduce the experimental design, data, and
methodology. We then evaluate the results, and discuss their implications. We
conclude with suggestions for expanding the research, and note some limitations to
our approach.
Usage Patterns of VEOs Online
The promulgation of open‐ and free‐Internet architectures requires less tech-
nical infrastructure for smaller or resource‐poor organizations to communicate and
conduct operations (Derrick, Ligon, Harms, & Mahoney, 2017a). Asymmetric or-
ganizations such as VEOs and criminal groups likewise expanded their reach and
capacity for operations. VEOs have narrowed the infrastructure gap with larger,
more affluent adversaries who have the means to develop expensive infrastructure
for internal communication (e.g., the US Government invests in internal commu-
nication portals for secure communication). VEOs leverage existing (Internet)
technologies to conduct their operations, recruit members, solicit financing, and
facilitate strategic objectives during conflict (Denning, 2010; Weimann, 2004). The
lowering of technological barriers has changed organizations’ behaviors on the
short‐end of the power asymmetry and enabled the historically disadvantaged
VEOs to launch social media campaigns akin to those of large governments and
corporations (Balmer, 2001; Bartlett and Reynolds, 2015; Fenstermacher & Leven-
thal, 2011).
Given the web’s inherent anonymity, limited regulation, rapid flow of in-
formation, and large audience (Weimann, 2004), the Internet has prompted a shift
in criminal and deviant behavior. In a review of how the Internet may amplify
deviant communities online (Recupero, 2008), defined and examined the online
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disinhibition effect of fifty‐three groups including propedophilia, hate groups,
proeating disorders groups, and terrorist groups. She found that problematic in-
ternet use by individuals interested in these groups increased dramatically. Re-
latedly, clandestine digital forums allow participants to express deviant opinions
with little fear of negative social consequences, such as being discredited or stig-
matized by mainstream elements (Steinfeldt et al., 2010).
Much research has been conducted on online behaviors of deviant groups,
such as the far right and racially‐motivated groups (Caren, Jowers, & Gaby, 2012;
Holt & Bolden, 2014; Steinfeldt et al., 2010), animal‐rights extremists (Braddock,
2015), gangs and gang members (Chen et al., 2004; Pyrooz, Decker, & Moule,
2013), proanorexia support groups (Boero & Pascoe, 2012; Fox, Ward, & O’R-
ourke, 2005), sex crimes and human trafficking (Dubrawski, Miller, Barnes,
Boecking, & Kennedy, 2015; Elliott & Beech, 2009; Latonero, 2011; Nagpal, Miller,
Boecking, & Dubrawski, 2017), and the drug trade (Fox, Ward, & O’Rourke, 2006;
Martin, 2013). VEOs’ Internet usage is similar to other types of online criminal
activities (Recupero, 2008) in that it is used to disseminate information and ac-
quire value resources such as recruits, funds, and weapons. For example, Moule,
Pyrooz, and Decker (2014) show that street gangs with a high degree of organ-
ization are more likely to utilize the Internet for recruitment and branding rel-
ative to other street gangs. It must be noted, however, that while some studies on
deviant groups work in the automated detection space (e.g., Dubrawski et al.,
2015), the characteristics of the signals from each type of deviant group are quite
distinct—signals and detection benchmarks of child pornography, gangs, or
supremacists do not necessarily transfer to jihadi content. The importance of our
ability to quickly and reliably detect and classify radicalizing content became
apparent in the aftermath of the 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings: a live feed
of the attack from the assailant’s bodycam was taken down from all large social
media platforms where it was hosted. The platforms, however, did not take
down the feed before it was copied, sometimes recut, and reposted hundreds of
thousands of times across platforms like Facebook, Reddit, and Twitter (https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/03/18/inside‐youtubes‐struggles‐
shut‐down‐video‐new‐zealand‐shooting‐humans‐who‐outsmarted‐its‐systems/?
utm_term = .bb581c44ea23). YouTube was forced to restrict search functionality
as the reposting of the (sometimes remastered) video overwhelmed their algo-
rithmic approach.
Recruiting
One of the most interesting aspects of VEOs is their use of information and
communication technologies (ICTs) to recruit members and acquire skills. Recruiting
is a central component of VEO leader decision making, resulting in a focus on
branding, organizational legitimacy, and creating a compelling narrative.1 Decisions
are both made and framed in relation to the brand, such as what alliances to endorse,
what media to use in recruiting, and what statements to make by key figures. In the
late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, members of the Chechen Mujahidin would
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film and distribute their armed attacks on the Russians on the Internet.2 While the
Chechen militants were aware of the marginal effects of their attacks, they were also
cognizant that hosting these attacks online would have greater effects in terms of
mobilizing sympathizers of their cause and demoralizing the opposition (Torres
et al., 2006). Additionally, VEOs utilize the Internet to establish online or virtual
communities of sympathizers and supporters. Individuals who feel otherwise dis-
connected may gravitate toward virtual communities where they feel accepted. As
such, virtual communities are a way for VEOs to foster a sense of in‐group mem-
bership and reach potential recruits in a way that could not be reached through
traditional face‐to‐face recruitment (Radlauer, 2007; Simi & Futrell, 2006).
As previously noted, VEOs are strategic about what media they publish online.
VEOs, like any organization, are concerned about establishing and maintaining
their brand given its influence on their target audiences’ (friend and foe) percep-
tions about the group (Pelletier, Lundmark, Gardner, Ligon, & Kilinc, 2016). In
turn, VEOs engage in innovative marketing strategies and craft specific types of
media to draw potential recruits toward the movement. For instance, Al Qaeda and
its regional affiliates (e.g., AQIM and AQAP) frequently craft messages that
highlight the ongoing “battle of civilizations” and the struggle against the far
enemy (United States). Al Qaeda deliberately used this narrative to project them-
selves as a global force, appealing to bored and alienated young males with the
promise of excitement and adventure (Baines & O’Shaughnessy, 2014; Baines et al.,
2010). Alongside violent narratives, VEOs such as ISIS have also capitalized on
using non‐violent themes as a recruitment tool. During a month‐long period in
2015, Winter (2015) discovered that 52.57 percent of all online media outputs from
ISIS emphasized utopian themes (also see Derrick et al., 2017b). These utopian
themes focused on everyday life in the caliphate such as religious and social
gatherings, economic activity, nature and wildlife, and governance. These themes
are intended to promote ISIS and its caliphate as a legitimate state (Winter, 2015).
Command and Control and Decision Making
VEOs use digital communications for command and control (Whine, 2010). This
is especially true for deterritorialized and/or decentralized organizations where the
Internet works as a command and control center to coordinate and dispersed
membership or attacks. For example, ISIS has been particularly adept at expanding
its organizational reach through the use of encrypted messaging applications. Recent
evidence indicates that ISIS remotely organized and instructed a cell in India to carry
out multiple attacks. Shortly after arresting five members of the cell, Indian au-
thorities discovered that ISIS had provided the cell with weapons, ammunition,
chemicals, and operational and technical assistance (Callimachi, 2017).
Previous work found that decision making occurs in private/deep web Internet
technologies and/or in face‐to‐face interactions (Derrick et al., 2017b), with the
open internet used to disseminate commands and to get reports on outcomes. The
dissemination of the decisions and command and control instructions may be de-
livered in several ways. For example, Al Qaeda relays messages to the public or
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specific target audiences, and once an effective message is released, the public and
news sources tend to spread the message with little effort from the group
(Thomas, 2003).
Transferring Ideological and Pragmatic Knowledge
Another way VEOs use ICT is to educate their followers. Essentially, ICT al-
lows for the widespread transferring of knowledge among all types of followers.
Knowledge transfer involves transmitting or sending knowledge to a potential
recipient and the absorption or use of the transferred knowledge (Davenport,
Delong, & Beers, 1998). VEOs have leveraged different ICTs such as knowledge
repositories to support the transfer of knowledge. These repositories are especially
relevant as they enable the rapid sharing of “know‐how” in an asynchronous
manner. This know‐how is represented in two dominant themes, ideology, and
pragmatism. First, VEOs use ICTs to transmit knowledge around “ideological
purity” and vision. In other words, organizations use technology to communicate
sacred values. A sacred value is more than just a shared value or moral value. It is a
value that is prescribed by deity and by which adherents judge and evaluate their
actions and ultimately their lives. Ideological leadership represents vision‐based
leadership, where the vision is a compelling, emotionally evocative view that ap-
peals to virtues of a past ideal state (e.g., a caliphate). Ideological leaders frame this
vision around values and standards that must be maintained to rebuild this “pure”
society (Mumford, Strange, & Bedell‐Avers, 2006). For example, VEOs use ICTs to
identify and highlight violations of standards, morals, and codes of conduct that
underlie the overarching ideology. Extreme ideological leaders tend to view vio-
lations of such standards and values in dichotomous terms, drawing distinct dif-
ferences between adherents and nonadherents. The ability to identify and enu-
merate violations gives a sense of moral superiority and “justness” to the leaders of
the cause. Their perceived and perpetuated rightness is necessary to build ideo-
logical legitimacy. The strict adherence removes dissonance that brings follower
attitudes more in‐line with the leaders’ desires. Similarly, ideological leaders tend
to hearken back to times of past greatness, drawing from key figures in the
ideology and lessons learned from them. Ideological leadership compares present
and past conditions. It can motivate and give a sense of time and purpose
(Freeman, 2014; Hofmann, 2017; Hofmann & Dawson, 2014; Mumford et al., 2007).
Second, VEOs use ICTs for the transmission and application of both declarative
and procedural knowledge through different presentation modes. These knowl-
edge repositories are likely to be found in the deep web, but some are also freely
available. There are sites that offer information about systems being used at loca-
tions of interest. Many of these knowledge repositories allow a user to enter system
information for the desired target and find specific vulnerabilities that have been
cited about that system or software. VEOs can use internet technologies to dis-
seminate and train individuals virtually (Derrick et al., 2017b). This requires fewer
experts and overcomes concern about colocation. This distance learning will be in
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private venues, possibly taking the form of synchronous or asynchronous
packages.
Existing Approaches
As illustrated above, VEOs across ideological types (e.g., religious, ethno‐na-
tionalist, and left‐wing) use ICTs to further their ideological and organization goals.
The remainder of this section, however, focuses on prior research on jihadist VEOs
for two reasons. First, data for this study comes from ISIS—a VEO with jihadi
motivations. Second, the past two decades have seen more and more interest in
researching digital jihadist narratives. For example, Table 1 summarizes some of
the recent works in this area. Although Table 1 is not an exhaustive list, it provides
context for differentiation of this work to other approaches. Immediately noticeable
is the preponderance of qualitative works using human raters in the VEO space.
These “expert‐based” and/or “content‐analytic” studies rely on one or more
human raters to identify and analyze different forms of ideological propaganda
(Cohen et al., 2016, pp. 2–3). The common criticism of this approach is that it relies
on subjective ratings and is open to biases. However, others suggest this approach
is better at contextualizing information compared to automated techniques (Cohen
et al., 2016). It is very clear that there are many potential negative downstream
effects like burnout or post‐traumatic stress for those who repetitively view and
process this content.
A second interesting takeaway from Table 1 is the diverse number of modal-
ities used to examine radicalizing propaganda. For example, several studies have
included more than one modality to examine propaganda‐related narratives. This
may be due to an increased awareness in the research community regarding the
number and types of social media websites currently available to terrorist organ-
izations. As Correa and Sureka (2013) suggest, deviant groups now have access to
various communication modalities such as weblogs, online forums, image sharing
websites (e.g., Flickr), and video sharing websites (e.g., YouTube). Thus, re-
searchers’ ability to triangulate information sources is more important now than
ever before. The ability to analyze multimodel content is further supported by the
domain’s general reliance on qualitative approaches. Very few studies tie multiple
platforms together (Hall, Mazarakis, Chorley, & Caton, 2018), and even fewer an-
alyze multiple contents types and/or formats (Wendlandt, Mihalcea, Boyd, &
Pennebaker, 2017).
Finally, Table 1 indicates that most of the recent works on Jihadi propaganda
have focused on Al Qaeda and their affiliated movements (AQAM) and, to a lesser
extent, ISIS. This is not surprising for two (related) reasons. First, AQAM and ISIS
have dominated the Jihadi extremist market for several years now (Ligon et al.,
2017). In turn, AQAM and ISIS are two of the most recognizable extremist “brands”
with the capacity and legitimacy to produce extended propaganda campaigns. In
other words, AQAM and ISIS can afford to publish extensive amounts of prop-
aganda, while smaller and lesser‐known groups either completely lack resources or
must funnel them to more pertinent organizational processes to survive.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Hall et al.: Radicalizing Content on the Open Social Web 9
Limitations of Existing Approaches
As alluded to above, the primary limitation of earlier attempts to categorize
types of messaging in extremist content is the overreliance on human coders. This is
problematic for three reasons. First, the scalability of such approaches is minimal.
The use of human coders is highly labor intensive. Extremist propaganda can also
be horrifically violent and likewise disturbing to human coders or platforms’
content reviewers—for example, the footage of the 2015 immolation of a Jordanian
pilot by ISIS. Burnout of the human coders is a real concern. Second, human coding
strategies are susceptible to pre‐existing assumptions or biases held by the raters. In
other words, the replicability and reliability of human‐coding strategies are limited.
Third, although the use of computerized approaches has grown in recent years, few
studies have examined the degree to computational methods compare with the
benchmark solutions found by human coders when categorizing extremist content.
In radicalization studies, often either human coders or computational pattern as-
sessments are presented as holistic results. However, to our knowledge no work
addresses if and to what extent a gap between human and machine understanding
of radicalizing content exists. On the basis of these limitations, we present the
guiding research question:
RQ: To what degree do computerized text‐analysis approximate benchmark
solutions of human coders taken from extremist content on the open web?
Methodology
Data and Its Collection
The data used in this exploratory study are one hundred English language
nonindexed, transient web pages posted by ISIS activists or supporters to open,
web‐based architectures. These data were harvested using a custom program ex-
tracting transient websites introduced and used in Derrick et al. (2017b) (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Flow Diagram for Monitoring and Scraping Transient Web Pages.
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A faction of the hacktivist group Anonymous code‐named Controlling Section
(@CtrlSec) was formed in early 2015 to help find and remove ISIS accounts from
Twitter (Macri, 2015). During much of this collection, CtrlSec posted ISIS members’
Twitter handles at a rate of approximately one every two minutes. Using the
Twitter API, the custom program (Figure 1) follows and logs the individual tweets
dispatched by CtrlSec accounts. The program first started collecting accounts re-
leased by CtrlSec in August 2015 and has been running since. Using the handles
posted by CtrlSec, the handles of suspected ISIS accounts are identified and fol-
lowed using the Twitter API.
From that list, the system utilizes the Twitter API to download a sample of the
latest tweets from the ISIS‐affiliated accounts. After being logged in the database,
the tweets are sorted into metadata (e.g., number of web addresses and links,
hashtags, mentions) and content (tweet text, links). Links which are posted in the
tweets of ISIS accounts are used as launching points to the open architectures
where richer content is housed. The software searches for links within tweets ref-
erencing anonymous posting services for open content‐publishing transient web
pages (e.g., JustPaste.it, dump.to). Next, the software automatically crawls to the
referenced webpage, captures PDF and HTML versions of the pages, and stores
them to the database. From these pages, the program identifies any links to other
transient web pages/open architectures, recursively downloading and analyzing
the content until all possible transient links have been found and captured. To date,
this process has resulted in the capturing and storing of over eight million one
hundred thousand tweets; one million three hundred thousand tweets URLs; one
million two hundred thousand images; and forty‐eight thousand transient web
pages. From the tweet metadata it can be determined that 69 percent of the total
tweets are written in Arabic, 13 percent in English, and 18 percent are other or
undefined. In a secondary step a Naive Bayes algorithm was applied to the tran-
sient web pages to determine the primary language and determined that 54 percent
of the web pages are written in Arabic, 38 percent in English, and 8 percent are
other or undefined.
Analysis
A high‐level overview of this article’s approach is as follows, and Figure 2
illustrates the workflow of the current study:
(1) Data Collection (see previous section, and Table 2).
(2) Analyze text samples via standard text analytics toolkits.
(3) Name concepts found in machine results in order to compare with qualitative
results (Table 2).
(4) Repeat steps four and five to produce range of accuracies and cross‐validate
results.
(5) Compare results of automated processes with qualitative results.
Seven researchers trained in qualitative measurements of ISIS leadership and
VEO communications evaluated the machine‐created features (explanatory
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characteristics) to measure goodness of fit to the human‐coded baseline in an open
coding format. Intercoder agreement was assessed in a jury format where coders
independently assessed the theme presented by the algorithm. Results were com-
pared between coders, and disagreements were discussed with two or more coders
and three faculty members with seven or more years of experience in qualitative
research until one single concept was agreed upon (see Results). A significant
problem in grounding truth between qualitative and quantitative results is in its
assessment. Human and the text analytics results produced different numbers of
themes (referred to as vectors where k∈ {37, 10, 20, 18}). Due to the uneven vectors
produced by the humans and algorithms (see discussion below) our study con-
centrated on qualitatively measuring goodness of fit. Finally, the themes were
operationalized in four states: the theme was present, half present, partially
present, or not present (see Tables 6 and 7).
The 2017 authors established thirty‐seven categories (themes) of activities and
outreach taking place online, where the reported the Cohen’s κ interrater agreement
as 0.64. These are thirty‐seven categories are represented in Table 1. By randomly
selecting the one hundred web pages, the 2017 authors sampled a wide variety of
types of web content produced by ISIS supporters as disseminated via transient
open architecture, including pictures or photographs with short captions or
headlines and text or essays. At the time of the data collection and analysis,
English‐only web pages warranted deep empirical attention for three primary
reasons. First, ISIS has directly engaged English speakers, particularly in the United
States. For example, in 2014 ISIS established a “#AmessagefromISIStoUS” mar-
keting campaign on Twitter and posted a YouTube video called “A message to the
Table 2. Manually Coded Results of VEO Content Scraped From Open Architectures and Social Media
(see Derrick et al., 2017b)
Quran 64 Help Locals 19
Legitimacy 43 Destroy property 19
Caliphate 38 Bayat 18
Education 37 Destroy by enemy 17
Violent items 35 Motivate 16
Mujahideen 34 Manuals 13
Apostate 34 Baghdad 12
Anti‐west 34 Shame 11
Jihad 31 Apocbattle 9
Sharia 30 Cyber 9
Destroy by ISIS 30 Hijrah 8
Atrocities 29 Hisbah 8
Mohammed 28 Repent 7
Media 28 Diyya 5
Justify 26 Ribat 5
Leader 25 Training 5
Territory 24 Village ldr 2
Military ops 24 Lone wolf 2
Shahid (Martyr) 20
Note: The terms reflect the feature identified, and the numbers reflect the frequency the coder
identified the item in the corpus.
ISIS, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; VEO, violent extremist organization.
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American People”—all in English. Second, given the threat of foreign terrorist
fighters returning to the West, it is imperative to examine the messaging content
that the majority of western citizens can read and understand. As such, despite the
majority of ISIS propaganda being in Arabic or other non‐English languages, a deep
understanding of ISIS’s messaging in English warrants attention. Finally, this is an
exploratory study that can be used to benchmark and examine larger data sets with
more languages.
The one hundred English‐only transient web pages provided a corpus com-
prising two hundred forty‐five thousand and seventy‐five words after removing
transliterations (6areeq, shaam) and misspellings (th for the; viel for veil). Trans-
literations and misspellings have an outsized impact on result quality in the n‐
grams analysis as they make the term matrix sparser, and are not recognized (and
thus excluded) by the dictionaries in the LIWC analysis. As such, they were ex-
cluded for all three analyses. Hence, two hundred fifteen thousand four hundred
and ninty‐nine words were recognized by English dictionaries (~88 percent). On
average, 67 percent of the words from each transient website were detected as
English. Words were transformed to lower case to avoid errors due to capital-
ization. Non‐alphanumeric characters were removed. Once a primary language of
the webpage was determined, characters outside of the particular language were
removed via regular expressions. URLs and other information specific to the
hosting service were also stripped from the webpage content before the analyses.
The current study employed simple, off‐the‐shelf packages. This has several
purposes. By employing standard packages, replicability is aided. Good practice
demands employing the computationally simplest packages in terms of eventually
benchmarking performance of more complex algorithms. Due to these reasons, we
employ n‐grams and LDA (Blei et al., 2003; Jurafsky & Martin, 2014). Both algo-
rithms are appropriate for creating feature vectors (vectors of explanatory charac-
teristics) from unstructured text. While similar in concept, the two approaches are
distinct.
The n‐grams are commonly used to summarize text given their basic co‐oc-
currence algorithmic basis. n‐grams can be trained and cross‐validated in a single
corpus. This has the desirable property of being insensitive to—and thus com-
parably flexible with—unknown words. It has also been used in similar approaches
in previous work (see e.g., Burnap & Williams, 2015, considering online hate). In
the n‐gram model, each word is assumed to be drawn from the same term dis-
tribution. A topic is drawn if a predetermined number comprised of a string of
words occurs. These strings are counted if the sequence occurs in the text 1+ times.
So, n‐grams are limited in contextualizing corpora as the results are context
insensitive (Jurafsky & Martin, 2014). Therefore LDA is also implemented in this
study (McCallum, 2002). A generative model, or a model with a joint probability
distribution, LDA is even more recognized as fitting the task of modeling themes in
text‐based corpora (Blei, 2012). A major draw, LDA’s bag‐of‐words assumption
allows the context and not only the topics to be identified. It has been applied in
similar detection scenarios, including detection of online pornography (Tang et al.,
2009) and hate speech (Burnap & Williams, 2015). We follow the standard process
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of LDA with Gibbs sampling (Blei, 2012; Boecking, Hall, & Schneider, 2015;
McCallum, 2002):
1. For each topic k
i. Draw a distribution over words Dirk Vβ η⃗ ~ ( ).
2. For each document d
i. Draw a vector of topic proportions Dird Kθ α⃗ ~ ( ⃗)
ii. For each word n,
1. Draw a topic assignment Z Multd n d, ( )θ~ ⃗ , ∈Z K1, ,d n, { … }
2. Draw a wordW Multd n Z, d n,( )β~ ⃗ , ∈W V1, ,d n, { … }
The hidden variables in this model are the topics β ⃗ , the proportions of topics
per document θ ⃗ , and the topic assignments per word Z. α⃗ controls the concen-
trations of topics per document, while η controls the topic‐word concentrations.
The multinomial parameters β ⃗ , the topics are smoothed by being drawn from a
symmetric Dirichlet conditioned on the data.
Finally, the sentiment analysis package LIWC was employed to assess the primary
structure of the content and latent meaning of the corpus. Meaning is fundamental in the
case of radicalizing content, and Natural Language Processing testing and validation on
VEO content (and other propaganda generally) is still lacking (Table 1). Sentiment
analysis is generally more appropriate for tackling latent meaning (Chen, 2008; Liu, 2010;
Mirani & Sasi, 2016). LIWC is a limitedly content‐sensitive sentiment analysis package
(Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzales, & Booth, 2007). This approach enables us to look
not only at usage or context but also the latent meaning of the corpus (Pennebaker,
Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003). The focus on latent meaning rather than individual
wording has the secondary useful attribute of allowing assessment of context even in the
case that the language/slogan changes, as the focus for LIWC is patterns in word usage,
and not the term itself. While drawbacks and criticisms of LIWC’s approach exist (see
e.g., Beasley &Mason, 2015; Panger, 2016), LIWC has been found to cope admirably well
with relatively sparse social media data (Lindner, Hall, Niemeyer, & Caton, 2015), and
has been successfully applied to suicide ideation scenarios (Handelman & Lester, 2007)
and analyses of terrorist discourse (Cohen et al., 2016; Logan & Hall, 2019; Pennebaker,
2011). A large basis of literature employs LIWC scoring either directly or in combination
with machine learning on social media data, making it the strongest benchmark senti-
ment analysis package to date (Coviello, Fowler, & Franceschetti, 2014; Hughes, Rowe,
Batey, & Lee, 2012; Kramer, 2012; Lin & Qiu, 2013; Thelwall, Buckley, & Paltoglou, 2012;
Thelwall, Buckley, Paltoglou, Cai, & Kappas, 2010).
Evaluation
n‐grams
Given the sparse corpus, we ran three experiments. The experiments looked at
strings of three, four, and five words (or, n‐grams). Of these, 4grams produced the
most compact results, reasonably preserving the grammar and structure of the
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documents. Instances of repetition or broken structure were consolidated when
they were obviously related (i.e., United States Department of, States Department
of State). This resulted in eight hundred and ninty‐seven unique observations
producing five thousand three hundred and seventy‐one 4grams. Figure 3 shows
that the distribution approximates Zipf’s Law. Twitter handles, tags, and IDs are
removed.
In the manual assessment, the jury (a team of four researchers) found that ten
topical themes emerged (Table 3). This is significantly lower than the thirty‐seven
themes listed in Table 2. Approximately a third of the corpus involves self‐refer-
































Number of unique 4grams
Figure 3. 4gram Distribution by Term Volume Demonstrating Zipf’s Law.
Table 3. Results of the 4gram Analysis With Topic Categories
Topic
Comparison to Derrick et al.
(2017b) Example Text f
Self‐reference Leadership; motivational speeches compassionate islamic state





may allah be pleased; the cause of















Diminishing the legitimacy of
others; Apostate regimes
abu bakr al baghdadi; bahira omar




Diminishing the legitimacy of
others; destruction
gunfire exchange with rafida; the
free syrian army
156, 2.9%
Transliteration of ahrar al shaam; in deir az zour 105, 1.9%
Unity Apostate regimes it saddens me how; brothers in
the west
103, 1.9%
Public Institutions national institutes of health; army
corps of engineers
81, 1.5%
Society Media centers may contain sensitive material;
islamic states reports src
88, 1.6%
Misc n a n a 51, .09%
Note: Column 1 represents the contained topics; column 2 compares to Derrick et al. (2017b);
column 3 contains sample 4grams; column 4 indicates the frequency of occurrence and
percent of corpus represented. The long tail is not included, thus the total does not equal one
hundred percent.
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Fifty‐one instances of 4grams are unclassified as they are either internet jargon or
otherwise defy meaningful interpretation in the 4gram form (e.g., “before right and
after”; “singing” n a n a in the text).
In comparison to the original study, the 4gram results are less granular than the
human coders. What is compelling about these findings is that while n‐grams
provided fewer categories than human coders, the observations within these cat-
egories resulted in higher‐level themes when compared with human coders—in
other words, 4grams produced more compact results compared with human
coders. Table 7 demonstrates that thirteen of the themes found in (Derrick et al.,
2017b) were subsumed by the seven n‐grams themes identified in Table 3. With one
thousand three hundred and twenty unique 4grams, our results indicate that the
presence of discourse about the US government and military is much more dom-
inant than the qualitative coders initially assessed in Derrick et al. (2017b). This may
be due to the fact that the qualitative coders added references to the US government
and military into adversarial themes. Interesting themes also emerged from the n‐
gram results that were not identified by human coders, especially transliterated
aspects and broad references to western society. Unity, a theme identified 88 times
by n‐gram, is particularly of interest as it theoretically should be tied to reasons for
joining terrorist organizations (i.e., Horgan’s work on “opportunities for camar-
aderie” indicates that terrorist propaganda is replete with messages about kinship
and unity [Derrick et al., 2017b]). As social media are one of the major recruitment
arms of ISIS and VEO groups broadly speaking, this particular theme would have
been expected to be much more present in the themes identified qualitatively.
Overall, naïve approaches like n‐grams deliver visibility into the corpus, but
poorly approximate qualitative benchmarks, particularly community‐oriented
topics and the least‐common results found manually (i.e., the long tail). This is
likely due to the word‐counting approach used. With its higher granularity, n‐gram
features miss the nuance and detail of qualitative results across all categories, but
do detect subtleties that human coders missed in other cases.
LDA
The MAchine Learning for LanguagE Toolkit’s (MALLET; McCallum 2002)
implementation of LDA was used to create feature vectors in the style of Boecking
et al. (2015). Several text‐preprocessing steps were conducted. Unwanted characters
and items in the messages are removed such as punctuation, emoticons, user‐
mentions, and URLs. Common stop words are also removed. A single input
document of the transient pages is created (n = 245,075) and passed on to LDA.
We used a symmetric Dirichlet distribution, initializing α to 0.5; β corresponds
to the word distribution for each topic (here, 15). K represents the number of
distinct concepts. We estimated the number of concepts in the corpus by examining
if the resulting topic models of different sizes resulted in reasonable, cohesive
topics that are not included as training data. All reported results are subject to a 10‐
fold cross‐validation. Thus, 2 × 6 experiments were conducted: one treatment where
the corpus contained twitter handles, and one where the corpus did not. No
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significant differences were observed. We conducted two hundred runs apiece for
each K ∈ {10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 37} on the training set (90 percent of documents), and
measured the perplexity on the validation set (the remaining 10 percent). Of these,
K = 20 yielded the best results. This is likely due to performance degradation from
the sparse text. Figure 4 represents the one hundred most frequent terms where the
word size is proportionate to its probability in the topic, but not proportionate to its
frequency in the corpus.
The twenty features that emerged converge more closely to the qualitative
results in terms of the focus on religious violence and apocalyptic viewpoints
(Table 4). This lines up with the two primary themes of ISIS content identified in
Derrick et al. (2017b), namely, Ideological Rationality and Violence (Table 5). Par-
ticularly interesting is that only two Twitter handles, @almoohajeermos and
@souriethipeace, were allocated in the experimental results with Twitter data. This
indicates the intensity of these two handles’ posts on specific topics. Surprisingly,
the LDA features highlight the hotly fought‐over cities Homs, Aleppo, and Mosul,
but neither Raqqa (the then‐capital of ISIS) nor Baghdad (as indicated in Table 2)
appear. Also broadly absent are features discussing the community around ISIS,
something quite present in the qualitative results. In agreement with the 4gram
results, religious outreach is hugely present. However, the US military, civil society,
and public media are nonexistent. Overall, however, LDA outperformed n‐gram in
that it identified seventeen of the constructs found by human coders (see Table 7).
Also, LDA was more effective at identifying violent themes. Given its relatively low
computational complexity and the fact that it is not strictly keyword or phrase‐
based, LDA may be useful for quickly identifying text‐based content that violates
Terms of Service, in terms of violent content.
Figure 4. Word Cloud Representing the One Hundred Most Frequently Returned Terms in Twenty
Feature Vectors of Jihadi Discourse.
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Table 4. Results of the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) Analysis With Topic Categories. Column 1
Represents the Named Topics; Column 2 Contains Sample Topics
Comparison to Results of Manual Coding in
Benchmark Article (Derrick et al., 2017b) Text in Feature Topics, α = 0.5, β = 15, K = 20
Caliphate/Unity Fight dawlah syria shariah war mentioned back path
tawheed called banner allaah evidence council
benefit
Sharia Law/Motivational Speeches Group muslim fighting clear center men matter
support dont disbelief reality areas true sharia
worship
Military Operations/Caliphate Muslims left person making killed caliphate believers
apostate proof makes mariahajer face fighter
haqq homs
Delegitimizing Rivals/Media People time good ali god taliban permissible end
amir wal didnt twitter giving pray deeds
Military Operations/Atrocities Make leave kill sham asked regime law wa put
khawarij khilafah video judgement battalion fact
Anti‐West Islam systems information ibn agency takfeer found
world great defense agreed prison means abdul
albani
Delegitimizing Rivals/Leadership People army groups disbelievers fought quran evil
hanisibu free syrian hadith imam based
allegiance stop
Violence State islamic shaam iraq ahrar gov join attacked
photo attacks difficult munafiqeen defected
hour turn
Jihad/Mujahedeen Jihad mujahideen religion leaders soldiers west part
attack wealth taking kuffar followers doesnt
control find
Mujahedeen/Bayat Killing kufr air base today battle ziadzd accept
women states lot muhajireen camp sake bayah
Delegitimizing Rivals Abu al command nusra told death signal lol sin
shaykh mujahid members jn muhajir operations
Quran Verses, Teachings, Prayers/Apostate
Regimes
Allah prophet messenger peace sunnah blessings
pleased heard merciful judge revealed family
barracks surely christian
Military Operations Khawrij fsa blood day scholars knowledge brother
claim city military mosul message amir till
commander
Delegitimizing Rivals/Apostate Regimes Ummah weapons muhammad call rule land
apostates years dead aleppo mullah knew omar long
mariahajer
Military Operations/Motivational Speeches Made killed souriethipeace abo words allies hasan
almoohajeermos fighters back happened night
jabalalaiza actions intelligence
Quran Verses, Teachings, Prayers Allah truth give lies book high life volume enemies
lying mercy fatawa lack speech hand
Anti‐West/Shaming Force brothers media ruling reason place order office
son lie sisters hell town issue witness
Self‐Reference Man due allah laws fear isis victory news leadership
emirate false matters country live praise
Delegitimizing Rivals Al jabhat nusrah front joulani statement deir zour az
started qaidah jawlani central approach joined
Leadership Al sheikh bin ah leader umar bakr shari baghdadi
ayman abdullah zawahiri liwa abi speaking
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Table 5. Component Transformation Matrix Results of the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) on Lin-
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LIWC
Finally, we assessed the latent structure of the sentiment behind the text with
LIWC (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). Considering composite variables, LIWC 2015
identified that 90.41 percent of the text could be classified as “Analytical,” in-
dicating the text’s propensity to portray reasoning: formal, logical, and hierarchical
thinking patterns. Analytical texts might be perceived as intellectual, rational,
systematic, emotionless, or impersonal. On the other hand, the analysis found that
only one percent of the corpus could be described as having an “Authentic” tone.
Authenticity in the case of LIWC 2015 is closely related to deception. Both values
are largely outside of their expected ranges as established in Pennebaker, Boyd,
Jordan, and Blackburn (2015). These aspects suggest that the text is pitching a vision
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The two hundred fifteen thousand four hundred and ninty‐nine words recognized
by English dictionaries from the one hundred web pages are scored for sentiment over
sixty‐four psycholinguistic categories. With this numeric data, we assess the latent
structure of the discourse with an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) run in SPSS Sta-
tistics 24. EFA allows us to understand how the concepts and the emotions behind the
corpus combine, creating a more granular assessment of online jihadists. The EFA
employed a varimax rotation, which converged in twenty‐one iterations, suppressing
coefficients below 0.3. The EFA produced eighteen latent constructs (Table 5) based on
the sentiment of the text, which were named by the content experts as discussed above.
Table 5 displays the component transformation matrix (CTM). The CTM transforms
rotated loadings by postmultiplying the matrix of the original loadings by the trans-
formation matrix. The values in the CTM are functions of the angle(s) of rotation of the
components. As they are measures of rotation degree, the intersection of two con-
structs is not expected to equal 1 as in a correlation matrix (For more information on
EFA and CTM, please see Harman, 1976). For the 18 × 64 rotated component matrix
listing the loading factors, please see the Supplementary Materials online.
Similar to LDA, LIWC directly matched human coders on 16 constructs, and
LIWC’s results lined up with those most frequently identified by humans (e.g., violent
content; see Tables 6 and 7 for more detail). LIWC also identified groupings that the
human coders did not (e.g., ideological adherence, as discussed in Derrick et al. 2017b).
Moreover, the two primary themes of ISIS content identified in the original article are
strongly present in the LIWC results (see Supplementary Materials; Table 7). The
Table 6. n‐grams, LDA, and LIWC Results Compared With the Two Major Themes of Ideological
Rationality and Violence Reported in Derrick et al. (2017b)
Table 6. (Continued)
Note: Fully darkened circles indicate fully present; half indicates mostly present; a quarter
circle indicates partially present; an empty space indicates not present in the results.
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alignment of the principle component analysis (PCA) results with the previous find-
ings suggest that the LIWC constructs demonstrate construct validity for VEO research
in as far as it concerns social data. Additionally, LIWC identified aspects of communal
living not present in the other feature vectors, similar to the Unity theme found by the
4grams analysis. Thus, while LIWCwas not a perfect match to the human coder, it was
a close approximate on the most important constructs. LIWC particularly identified
subtler groupings that human coders also found, which were however lost in the
4gram and LDA results (e.g., impact uncertainty).
Discussion
Overall, all three automated coding procedures performed similarly to the human
coder in terms of detecting the most frequently occurring content (e.g., anti‐Western
sentiment). Their performance varied wildly from the 2017 results at the long tail.
Table 7 compares the efficacy of each computational approach as compared to the
human coders. While no one procedure matched human coder findings perfectly,
Table 7. Full Comparison of n‐grams, LDA, and LIWC Against Manually Coded Radicalizing Discourse
Found in Transient Web Pages. Fully Darkened Circles Indicate Fully Present; Half Indicates Mostly
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human‐identified themes such as Qur’anic Verses, Diminishing the Legitimacy of
Rivals, and Anti‐West rhetoric were identified by n‐gram, LDA, and LIWC. However,
less‐frequently occurring themes identified by human coders (e.g., Hisbah,3 Training
Camps) were not detected by any of the automated techniques. This has several
implications. It is reasonable to assume that automated processes can be powered by
off‐the‐shelf text analytics packages to detect and classify major themes; however, we
cannot expect a high overall accuracy rate due to these approaches’ lack of nuanced or
latent theme detection. This split between effectiveness when classifying common
themes and latent or nuanced themes has been shown in practice by those platforms
that publish their results (e.g., Facebook).
While it is encouraging to find that humans and machines recognize and un-
derstand major concepts similarly, it is disappointing that the machines did not
detect themes like Lone Wolf/Call for Attacks on Foreign Lands, as these are the
type(s) of propaganda which can be acted on with very little interaction between
the group and the individual (Ligon et al., 2018), and thus are harder to practically
manage. The reasons for the lack of signal at the long tail could be many, in
addition to high signal/noise problems. Some of the text may be accompanied by
images, which are out of scope for this study. With the original study’s α of 0.64, it
is possible that the human classifiers artificially compartmentalized the structure of
the text compared to computational classification (e.g., Hijrah could belong to
Qu’ranic Verses/Teachings).
Conclusion
Much like pornography, “you know VEO content when you see it”—describing
it however is not straight‐forward. Where the qualitative efforts are valuable, their
practical usefulness is limited due to the nature and scale of the content, as well as
with inherent bias added by human processing. Automated classification based on
latent patterns in radical content promises to be more efficient. This work finds
however that the computational approach has not yet fully approximated manual
coders’ understanding of ground truth. Reasons for this are varied, but are likely
due to the differences in humans’ holistic consumption of VEO content compared
with the reliance of computational approaches on naïve pattern mining of the data.
While neither approach is perfect, a computational approach that misses highly
emotive VEO content (e.g., Lone Wolves) is not sufficient to implement in a real‐
world scenario. This has been practically experienced by open social platforms as
they reactively manage and remove VEO content. This work is a first effort toward
empirically outlining possible reasons that misclassifications can (and do) occur.
On the basis of these results, we argue that before fully automated approaches can
be implemented, a more careful blending of human content understanding and
machine abilities is required.
In response to the original research question of how well the processes approx-
imate one another, it is compelling and promising that many high‐level concepts
transfer well, especially themes surrounding violence and delegitimizing rivals.
However, the granularity found by human coders is absent, for example, the machine
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approaches missed themes of education, instructional materials, and some theological
topics like Hisbah. And indeed, some concepts like Unity (found by the n‐gram
analysis) were not present in the 2017 results. This suggests that while there is more
work to be done, a computationally efficient and theoretically‐grounded set of features
can be developed to aid in automatically detecting radical content on the open internet.
The missing puzzle pieces are described in the coming section.
Limitations and Future Work
Despite the global outlook of jihadists, the lingua franca of groups like ISIS is
Arabic, which is poorly covered in the literature. This is important to note for any
language‐based automated detection task, as it has been shown that prediction accu-
racy is best when the locally dominant language is also employed in conjunction with
English (Boecking et al., 2015). Thus, a serious limitation to our approach is the lack of
availability of validated Arabic NLP packages. Currently available packages like
CORE NLP and Weka only offer partial functionality; LIWC’s Arabic dictionaries are
also still in the validation process. Our approach also lacks several more expansive or
more granular assessments due to the lack of reliable Arabic language algorithms. This
also partially explains the relatively simplistic, off‐the‐shelf approach selected. Our
approach relies on character recognition to split multilingual texts; this unsophisticated
approach would be better treated with language detection capabilities and could have
possibly caused misallocation of words. Other approaches for text processing in-
cluding td‐idf, entity recognition algorithms, or lemmatization do not fit the current
scope, although they are being considered for future work. tf‐idf, a process to establish
how important a word is in a given document, was not included in the initial work as
it may inadvertently misallocate words that appear frequently (e.g., self‐references,
references to religious figures), which are pertinent to ISIS’s branding and recruitment
strategies (Derrick et al., 2017b; Ingram, 2016).
Future works may also consider evaluating the accuracy of the assignment of
documents to specific topics, and not merely the creation of topics as demonstrated
here. Finally and possibly crucially, some web pages are accompanied by images;
this could explain the granularity of the human‐coder results, particularly at the
long tail, which is not replicated by text analysis algorithms employed in the cur-
rent analysis. More work needs to be directed at the analysis of images (pictures
and videos) alone and concurrently with text‐based feature vectors.
Possible extensions of this work are many. The foremost goal is developing a
flexible, detection algorithm to support the classification of radicalizing content.
This can include language‐based features, metadata‐based features (views, shares,
likes), or image properties. Such content requires that any feature‐based classifier
be linguistically localized, and extensive work must be done on Arabic NLP ca-
pabilities to realize this. Another extension is understanding precisely what content
radicalizes. This requires a multi‐method approach, including content analysis,
topic modeling, and sentiment analysis. To support triangulation of the above
results, an eye‐tracking study evaluating what content is consumed by reviewers
when they view VEO content would be useful. At this point, we can expect to find
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an approximation of the “ground truth,” which allows us to begin working on
predication scenarios.
Validating our approach across different open and social media platforms
would help understand the context of radicalization, and pathways of radical-
ization of (vulnerable) individuals. Finally, from both the perspectives of content
generation and research, the next frontier of social media research is in visual
media. Computer vision has been employed recently to combat human trafficking
(Dubrawski et al., 2015) and child pornography (Ulges & Stahl, 2011) but has yet to
be trained and tested on jihadi content. Research is required to adapt the concepts
to the VEO scenario, and expand the capabilities of the computer vision domain by
training algorithms on radicalizing content scraped from outlets like YouTube,
Instagram, and visual content from sites like Twitter and Facebook.
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Notes
1. “Leadership decision making” refers to the strategic, operational, and tactical decisions made by
violent extremist leaders to ensure the survival of their organization. For instance, leadership deci-
sions on how to brand their organization play a large role in the specific types of people they can
recruit.
2. At the time, the Chechen Mujahidin would qualify as a VEO since the organization showed markers
of operational collaboration, specialization, and a shared ideological mission against Russian occu-
pation (Ligon et al., 2013).
3. Hisbah refers to the individual and collective duty to intervene and coercively “enjoy good and
forbid wrong” in accordance with Sharia law.
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